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1 Introduction
For a number of scholars, decentralisation – ‘defined
as the meaningful authority devolved to local units of
governance that are accessible and accountable to
the local citizenry’ (Blair 2000: 21) – provides space
for people to participate in local development, ensure
a more efficient allocation of resources, enhance local
resource mobilisation and improve accountability. This
in turn enhances the capacity of governments for
more effective poverty reduction strategies.
However, ‘decentralisation is not a panacea and often
contributes little to poverty reduction’ (Johnson 2001:
529). Furthermore, ‘the more pessimistic argument
has been that decentralisation simply opens up spaces
for the empowerment of local elites, not for
considerations of the voices and interests of the more
marginalised’ (Gaventa 2001: 6). In Latin America, few
decentralisation processes have reached their alleged
goals, and some have even produced unwanted
outcomes (Llambí and Lindemann 2001).
In Mexico, after more than two decades of
significant institutional and political change, the
federal government has decentralised important
resources and powers to sub-national governments.
Today, state and municipal governments provide
virtually all the services of basic education, health and
social infrastructure to their citizens.
Yet, the promise that decentralised governments are
more responsive to the needs of the poor and
therefore enhance the possibilities for improving the
well-being of the people, have not yet been realised.
Recent literature on decentralisation in the health
and education sectors in Mexico has not found much
improvement in the delivery of such services and
there is no clear evidence about the use of these
resources at the state or municipal level. Moreover, in
the case of the funds that are directly spent by states
and municipalities for basic social infrastructure –
drinking water, electricity or sewage, etc. – there is
some evidence that shows that in a few cases, the
resources are channelled to activities that could not
be considered as social infrastructure (Hernández
Licona et al. 2003: 33; Díaz-Cayeros and Silva 2004).
It is been argued that although sub-national
governments have gained from the decentralisation
reforms, particularly in capacity building and decision
making, and despite the increase in resources
transferred to the sub-national level, the overall
impact of decentralisation has not been positive.
This article suggests that although sub-national
governments now have a more significant role in
service delivery than they had two decades ago,
service delivery has not necessarily improved. Despite
governments closer to citizens having more political
and financial capacities to provide public services to
those citizens, the mechanisms to make these public
officials accountable are weak, undermining the
prospects of decentralisation for more equitable
service provision.
The following section in this article examines the
politics of the decentralisation process in Mexico. The
next section elaborates on the limitations of the
decentralisation process and the final section
explores the impact of decentralisation on service
delivery in three broad sectors: health, education and
social infrastructure.
2 The politics of decentralisation in Mexico
Despite its federal structure, Mexico has been
characterised as a highly centralised system in
political and economic terms, that has structurally
limited sub-national governments from participating
in the general advantages of federal regimes.
For years, ‘the federal government controlled about
85 per cent of public revenues, the state
governments controlled less than 12 per cent, and
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the municipalities scarcely 3 per cent’ (Cornelius and
Craig 1988: 206). The centralisation of financial
resources was a crucial strategy in maintaining the
stability of the political regime.
Politically, the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party)
dominated the Mexican political system at virtually all
levels of government. Under this system, the president
– leader of both the government and the party – was
able to undermine the institutional separation of
powers that permits a federal system of checks and
balances to work properly. The so-called meta-
constitutional powers of the president allowed him to
have enormous power to implement policy changes
(Nacif 2002: 1); they allowed him to undermine the
role of sub-national political actors in the policymaking
process. The power of the president to designate his
successor, the governors of the 31 states and the
candidates to the bicameral Congress assured that
(a) sub-national political officials were accountable to
the president and not to the other branches of
government and (b) that decisions over resource
allocation were taken by the top political elite in the
central government with little or no influence from
other political actors (Edmonds 1998: 6). Finally, as the
natural counterweights of any federal system were not
working properly, accountability in the use of public
resources was virtually absent.
Since the early 1980s, pressures for democratisation,
economic crisis and the implementation of market-
oriented economic reforms encouraged policymakers
to decentralise. The debt crisis challenged the statist
developmental model that had been in place for
decades (Otero 2004). The country was obliged to
abandon the protectionist, import-substitution
industrialisation process and to adopt a series of
market-oriented economic reforms to address the
effects of the crisis. The new developmental model
reduced the state’s economic role and opened up
Mexico’s economy to foreign trade and investment.
This dramatic transformation of the Mexican
economy had negative effects for the population.
Austerity and adjustment reforms reduced social
spending and subsidies. As Handelman (1997: 45)
noted, ‘the deteriorating economy and the reduced
size of the state sector … decreased public support
for the political establishment by curtailing its ability
to fund programs and dispense patronage’.
Moreover, as a result of the social costs resulting
from structural adjustment policies, by the mid-1980s
opportunities for new civil society organisations
developed rapidly in opposition to the new economic
model. In addition, the ruling party was under
unprecedented electoral pressure from the right-
wing party – the PAN (National Action Party) – in
many northern states. To make things worse for the
PRI regime, in 1987 a group of PRI members from
the Corriente Democrática1 (Democratic Current), in
clear opposition to the economic model adopted by
the government and to the non-democratic
practices of the ruling party, split from the PRI,
opening the door to the emergence of a left
coalition (Frente Democrático Nacional), with the
possibility of defeating the ruling party.
Under this new political dispensation, in 1988, ‘after a
hotly disputed race marred by widespread fraud,
President Carlos Salinas took office declaring the end
of the one-party system. He promised a new
relationship between state and society’ (Fox 1994: 165).
He adopted decentralisation as one of the major
components of the government’s development
strategy. Under his administration, the National
Solidarity Programme (Solidarity) was created. Formally,
it aimed to deal with the social costs of austerity that
the adjustment policies had caused. However, for a
number of scholars (Fox 1994; Rodríguez 1993) the
programme was politically motivated and was used as
an instrument to restore presidential legitimacy2 and to
enhance PRI power for electoral ends, thereby
reinforcing the power of the federal government. As
Shirk (1999: 5) suggests, ‘Solidarity ... served to reinforce
the centre’s power through deconcentration, because
it deliberately bypassed state and local governments ...
by extending the federal government’s linkages all the
way to the community level’. For Fox (1994: 179),
‘Solidarity’s electoral targeting certainly helped to buffer
the political impact of the government’s controversial
macroeconomic program, weakening the opposition in
the short run in some areas’.
Despite this political bias, the transfer of resources to
lower levels of government increased considerably
and government agencies were decentralised. Thus
as Cornelius (2000: 119) argues, ‘Solidarity, which
started out as a quintessentially centralising,
presidential program ended up being a major vehicle
for decentralisation, especially the kind that transfers
power to the state level’.
By 1995, the newly elected president Zedillo inherited
a country facing political chaos3 and the worst
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economic crisis of Mexico’s modern history weakened
the credibility of the new government. At the same
time, the fact that opposition political parties had
already gained important political positions at all
levels of government and that most PRI governors at
that time had been elected during Salinas’
presidential term, opened the door to new tensions
between the centre and the periphery that, in some
cases, challenged presidential authority (Cornelius
1999). This new political scenario led to increasing
pressure on the centre as governors and mayors
began to appeal for greater and more equitable and
transparent resource distribution. In this sense, as a
number of scholars suggest (Shirk 1999; Cornelius
2000), Zedillo had little choice but to carry out a
redistribution of political and fiscal power during his
term and to deepen decentralisation.
In 1997, when the opposition won the majority of
the Congress, the demands from the opposition
parties for political reform started to be raised more
concertedly as the limits of the presidential system
were thrown into sharp relief. Since 1997, the
president lost his ability to initiate policy changes
unilaterally (Nacif 2002), thus heralding a new era of
executive-legislative relations, where the former had
to negotiate to set the congressional agenda and to
pass legislation.
One of the historical demands from opposition
political actors was the expansion of sub-national
autonomy. The new opposition-dominated Congress
pressed for serious moves towards devolution and in
1998, the fiscal decentralisation process was
strengthened by the creation of a variety of fiscal
funds for sub-national governments. The funds were
allocated under ‘item 33’ of the federal budget to
directly transfer financial resources to states and
municipalities. Item 33 secured an expansion and
rationalisation of decentralisation transfers under a
new budget line (Haggard and Webb 2000). For the
states, item 33 increased the predictability of
education and health transfers. It also represented a
serious effort to depoliticise the transfers system by
setting formulas for the distribution of federal
resources to the states and municipalities.
For 20 years, decentralisation has been one of the
major components of the government’s
development strategy. By the end of the 1980s, it
‘had become a primary element in the political
discourse’ (Rodríguez 1993: 136). The trend towards
decentralisation continued into the 1990s and was
strengthened by an active transfer of funds and
responsibilities directly to lower levels of
government. Today, local governments have more
responsibilities and resources than ever before, to
provide public services to their population. On the
expenditure side, in Mexico, more than half of
federal public expenditure is spent by sub-national
governments. Yet, in terms of revenues, the fiscal
system continues to be one of the most centralised
in the world as the federal government collects
around 90 per cent of total revenues. This raises
serious questions as to what local governments will
do with funds they have not raised under their own
auspices.
The decentralisation process in Mexico has been
linked to a new political dynamic where sub-national
political actors have been able to put more pressure
on the central government for more fiscal and
political autonomy (Beer 2004). Due to the
democratisation process and the increasing amount
of resources and responsibilities transferred from the
federal government, local governments have a more
important role within the federal system. Yet, despite
these positive characteristics, states remain highly
dependent on the federal government, not only for
resources but also for policy implementation and
decision making. At the same time ‘Mexican
democracy suffers from failures in accountability at all
levels of government’ (Diaz-Cayeros forthcoming);
the decentralisation process has not been
accompanied by institutional mechanisms that could
make local politicians accountable.
3 Decentralisation without accountability
Some eight years on, since item 33 was created as a
means to strengthen the capacity of states and
municipalities to deliver public services effectively to
the population, it seems that the political dynamics
of the federal system have undermined the capacity
of citizens to influence policymaking and to
guarantee that resources are channelled and used to
benefit the poor.
As it has been argued, the decentralisation process in
Mexico has followed a political logic, where the
federal government has transferred funds to lower
levels of government, to help face the increasing
demands from sub-national political actors for more
political and financial autonomy. Dramatic shifts in
the configuration of the political map due to
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increasing competition in local elections and more
access to financial resources at the local level
reshaped the relationship between central and lower
levels of government. Sub-national political actors
elected through more democratic and transparent
elections became aware of the importance of
gaining financial and political autonomy from central
government. As politics at the sub-national level
became more pluralistic and democratic, political
actors at the local level gained incentives to broaden
their policy influence and expand their political
capital within and outside their jurisdiction (Beer
2004). With more decision-making powers and
resources, sub-national political elites could increase
their ability to compete for political space.4 In this
sense, in the last few years, sub-national political
actors have obtained an extraordinary share of
resources to be used to provide key public services to
the population.
Both decentralisation and democratisation have
reshaped the political dynamics of the federal
arrangement in Mexico. Today, sub-national political
actors, particularly governors and mayors, have
access and control over important resources to
provide public services but the institutions to limit
and audit the use of those resources lack human and
financial resources and institutional autonomy. In
other words, decentralisation strengthened the
capacity of sub-national political actors to insert their
interests into national politics. Unfortunately, key
aspects of decentralisation as the implementation of
effective mechanisms to make public officials
accountable have been left behind. Thus, in many
cases, resources are not allocated according to the
interests of the citizens, which is one of the stated
goals of decentralisation.
In this sense, it can be argued that the
decentralisation process in Mexico has been shaped
by the interests of the political elite at the national
level, as well as by the more active role of sub-
national political actors in the national arena. The
political struggles and interests of the different
political actors within the federal system have played
a major role in determining the limited social
outcomes of the decentralisation process in Mexico.
4 Decentralisation and service delivery
The decentralisation of public services is part of a turn-
around in Mexico’s economy and politics since the
1980s. It was expected to improve service provision, as
decision making and policy implementation could be
more easily monitored by citizens at the local level.
Since 1998, when item 33 was created, resources
have been channelled to finance public services that
were decentralised at the beginning of the 1990s, i.e.
basic education and health. In addition, under
item 33 of the budget, the federal government
allocated resources to finance municipal projects for
basic social infrastructure through the Municipal
Social Infrastructure Fund (FAISM). According to the
Fiscal Coordination Law (FCL), these funds should be
targeted to the poorest communities in each
municipality to carry out physical infrastructure
projects: potable water, sewers, drainage,
urbanisation, rural electrification, basic education and
health infrastructure, roads, housing improvements
and productive rural infrastructure.
At the time of writing, item 33 is the most important
source of finance for states and municipalities. Under
this new scheme, sub-national governments provide
essential services to their citizens, as almost 85 per
cent of item 33 is allocated to: health, basic education
and social infrastructure. Yet, although item 33
represents an important step forward towards a
more predictable and transparent transfers system as
it allows the distribution of resources to state and
municipal levels of government, in practice, it seems
that the new distribution of federal transfers to lower
levels of government may not have benefited the
most disadvantaged regions of the country and
effectively address the real needs of the poor.
A 2005 study on service provision in Latin America
notes that, despite the fact that service coverage has
increased in many countries of the region in the last
two decades, strong inequalities persist in the
provision of basic public services. In the case of
Mexico, although it is among the successful countries
who have expanded coverage of basic public services
throughout its population, strong inequalities still
persist across regions and among different sectors of
the population (World Bank 2005).
In the case of education for example, on the one hand
in his study on decentralisation of education, Merino
(1997) points out that education achievement has not
improved significantly since decentralisation took place.
In terms of disparities across states, he shows how,
between the state with the highest average of
schooling and the states with the lowest average,
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there is a difference of almost five years. On the other
hand, disparities across social groups are also
important. As the World Bank (2005: 12) notes, ‘the
average person in the bottom quintile of the income
distribution has 3.5 years of schooling, compared with
11.6 years for a person in the top quintile’.
In general, decentralisation of education represented
a decentralisation of management functions, but not
a decentralisation of decision-making powers. As
Cabrero and Martínez-Vázquez (2000: 153) suggest,
the reform ‘resembles administrative
deconcentration rather than true decentralisation’.
The decentralisation of education allowed the
federal government to provide sub-national
governments with financial resources but within
central government guidelines. At the same time,
the assignment of responsibilities between the state
and federal level was in some cases unclear, leading
to inefficiency in the delivery of services particularly
at the state level. In addition, given the shared
responsibility for education services, between the
federal and state levels, accountability was also
reduced, as the blame for bad performance could
easily be shifted between levels of government.
Decentralisation of health services also reflects similar
problems. According to Moreno (2001), there are
significant disparities in the distribution of
decentralised resources across states. He points out
that the distribution of federal funds in the health
sector is influenced by regional socioeconomic
conditions, but other variables such as the installed
capacity of health services remain the most
influential. In addition, it is not clear to what extent
states are autonomous in managing financial
resources. States have to comply with a series of
minimum standards in order to allocate resources.
Unfortunately, ‘there is still confusion on what these
minimum standards are and how they should be
interpreted’ (Cabrero and Martínez-Vázquez
2000: 163). Also, the distribution of resources, in
particular the formulas for the allocation of health
funds under federal transfers, create some problems
for the improvement of this service.
In the case of the FAISM, its creation represented a
step forward in the decentralisation of powers and
resources directly to municipalities, as resources from
FAISM were totally transferred to the states and to the
municipalities to finance social infrastructure, using a
formula indicated in the FCL, which assigns the
resources under a relative position of the municipalities
according to a poverty and marginalisation index
(Hernández Licona et al. 2003: 33).
Historically, FAISM resources exceeded the total
budget of the Federal Ministry of Social Development.
In addition, in contrast to health and education grants,
sub-national governments have more room for
manoeuvre in the use and distribution of FAISM
grants. FAISM could be a key policy instrument to
combat poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, research
by Díaz-Cayeros and Silva (2004) has found that there
is no relationship between the amount of resources
used for the construction of basic social infrastructure
at the local level and an improvement in service
delivery. Moreover, the institutional capacity to
evaluate and monitor the use of public resources at
the local level is extremely limited. Contrary to other
federal social programmes, monitoring and evaluation
systems for the use of FAISM are extremely weak. As
a result, it is not clear how local governments actually
use the fund.
Today, the three major funds of item 33 – health,
education and social infrastructure – reflect
important limitations that impact on the provision of
public services. Despite the political developments
that Mexico has recently experienced, some aspects
may have a negative impact on the performance of
decentralised funds for pro-poor service delivery.
First, the transfer system is still complex and unclear
as the distribution of resources to state governments
is based on the historical patterns of federal
expenditure before decentralisation and not on an
explicit formula that includes equity and efficiency
concerns. In this sense, the current system is
characterised by important disparities across sub-
national governments; thus states with lower levels
of development are receiving fewer resources than
better-off regions (De la Torre 2004). Second, while
states and municipalities have more resources to
provide public services than ever before, the
institutions and mechanisms to guarantee a
transparent and effective use of the resources
remain weak. Third, the strong dependence of sub-
national governments on federal funds and the lack
of clarity in the assignment of responsibilities is
(a) undermining the capacity of sub-national
governments to deliver better services because ‘each
level of government can blame the other for not
doing its part’ (Cabrero and Martínez-Vázquez
2000: 152), and (b) is discouraging local tax efforts, as
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sub-national political actors ‘are reluctant to bear the
political (and organisational) costs of enforcing local
taxes ..., when they can take advantage of federal
resources at virtually no cost’ (Moreno 2003: 16). This
has meant an increasing dependence of sub-national
governments on federal transfers.
5 Conclusion
As it has been argued, the decentralisation process in
Mexico opened up the once-centralised federal
system in Mexico. It opened up debate on local
interests at national level. In particular, the
introduction of item 33 represented a step forward
in terms of the decentralisation process, as the new
funding arrangement system appeared to be more
transparent, more efficient and less discretionary. At
the same time, item 33 represented the beginning
of a new era where sub-national governments
became responsible for the provision of most public
services.
Yet, item 33 has not yet solved effective service
delivery and equity objectives. In practice, it seems
that the use of federal transfers has emphasised the
financial dependence of local governments, but has
not entirely solved the problem of distribution of
resources, and has not enhanced the capacity of
citizens to hold sub-national politicians accountable
for results.
The decentralisation process has reshaped the
political dynamics within the federal arrangement,
therefore impacting on the performance of sub-
national governments. In particular, decentralisation
of political and fiscal resources to sub-national units
of government – through previously dormant
constitutional powers – drove a new redistribution
of power within the different political actors in the
federal system (Gibson 2004). It is true that sub-
national governments have gained as a result of
decentralisation, however its pro-poor potential is
yet to be seen. It seems that decentralisation has
shown some progress in Mexico, but it can only fulfil
its promise of greater efficiency and responsiveness
if local governments can be held accountable,
especially to low-income citizens.
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Notes
1 Corriente Democrática was formed in 1986
within the PRI, with the aims of lobbying against
Mexico’s new economic model and of promoting
the democratisation of the party.
2 The 1988 Presidential election result was one of
the most contested in Mexican modern history. A
major post-electoral conflict weakened the newly
elected presidency.
3 In January 1994, there was an armed rising by the
Zapatistas in the southern state of Chiapas. On
23 March, the PRI presidential candidate, Luis
Donaldo Colosio, was murdered. Both events
were a shock to the political system and to the
financial markets.
4 It is worth noting that in the 2000 Presidential
election, the candidates of the three major
parties had been governors.
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